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Who	is	helped	by	Help	to	Buy?
What’s	not	to	like	about	a	policy	which	can	expand	home	ownership	and	boost	the	supply	of	housing?	Geoff	Meeks
and	J.Gay	Meeks	recount	some	of	the	doubts	about	the	efficacy	of	the	government’s	Help	to	Buy	scheme.	They
present	new	evidence	on	some	of	its	regressive	distributional	consequences,	and	touch	on	the	opportunity	cost	of
the	subsidy	programme.
At	first	sight	the	government’s	Help	to	Buy	(H2B)	programme	is	very	appealing.	It	is	targeted	at	a	pressing	economic
and	social	problem:	house	prices	have	raced	ahead	of	employment	incomes.	The	average	home	price	was	3.6	times
the	average	income	in	England	and	Wales	in	1997;	it	is	now	7.6	times	(15	times	in	many	parts	of	London).	H2B
allows	people	in	England	to	buy	new	homes	with	deposits	of	just	5%	and	a	government	loan	on	very	favourable
terms,	to	augment	a	commercial	mortgage.	The	loan	is	interest-free	for	the	first	five	years.	It	can	be	used	for	20%	of
the	property’s	value	if	outside	London	and	40%	in	London.	The	buyer	can	use	the	scheme	for	properties	up	to	the
value	of	£600,000.	The	scheme	started	in	April	2013;	so	far	some	£7	billion	of	government	loans	have	been	agreed;
and	recently	a	further	£10	billion	have	been	earmarked.	The	scheme	is	restricted	to	purchases	of	new	homes,	but	not
restricted	to	first-time	buyers.
The	drawbacks
Economists	often	mention	three	potential	drawbacks.	First,	subsidies	may	be	showered	on	recipients	who	would
have	taken	the	targeted	action	anyway.	Second,	the	subsidy	may	end	up	in	the	pocket	of	someone	other	than	the
target	recipient.	And,	third,	the	subsidy	may	end	up	exacerbating	the	problem	it’s	supposed	to	mitigate.
On	the	first,	research	suggests	that	about	35%	of	H2B	recipients	could	have	bought	a	home	without	the	subsidy.	On
the	second	and	third,	eminent	authorities	including	the	IMF	and	the	OBR	have	argued	that	H2B	is	not	likely	to	elicit	a
significant	increase	in	the	supply	of	houses.	Profit-maximising	management	of	building	plots	is	central	to	the
business	model	of	house-builders.	Just	as	with	OPEC’s	restriction	of	oil	supplies,	the	interest	of	the	builders	is	best
served	by	drip-feeding	land	into	the	market,	maintaining	or	increasing	prices.	Executives	would	be	failing	in	their	duty
to	pursue	shareholders’	interests	if	they	flooded	the	market,	depressing	prices.
In	practice,	H2B	is	expected	to	soften	buyers’	resistance	to	builders’	price	rises.	As	it	is	only	available	for	new
homes,	a	Londoner	faced	with	the	choice	between	a	new	house	costing	£550k	and	an	identical	second-hand	house
at	the	same	price	can	get	an	H2B	subsidy	of	around	£7k	a	year	(the	interest	saved)	if	she	opts	for	the	new	house.	So
the	new	house	will	be	much	the	better	buy,	and	it	will	be	worth	her	while	to	pay	more	for	the	new	than	for	the	second-
hand	house.	The	builder	knows	this,	and	prices	accordingly.
Sir	Steve	Nickell	of	the	OBR	commented	to	the	Treasury	Committee:
The	key	issue	is,	is	[H2B]	going	to	just	drive	up	house	prices?	By	and	large,	in	the	short	run,	the	answer
is	yes.	But	in	the	medium	term,	will	the	increased	house	prices	stimulate	more	house-building?	Our
general	answer	would	probably	be	a	bit,	but	the	historical	evidence	suggests	probably	not	much.
One	consequence	of	the	H2B	subsidy	further	stoking	the	inflation	of	house	prices	is	that	the	initial	aim	of	the	scheme
is	subverted:	renters	who	can’t	take	advantage	of	the	H2B	subsidy	are	left	further	behind.	Another	is	that	part	of	the
benefit	of	the	subsidy	is	appropriated	by	the	builders.	To	explore	this	appropriation	process	we	have	analysed	the
annual	reports	for	the	last	seven	years	of	the	major	builders	involved	in	H2B.	Table	1	shows	the	total	H2B	loans
extended	by	the	government	nationally	in	each	year	since	2013;	and	the	builders’	average	profit	margin	and	return
on	equity	for	two	years	before	and	each	year	after	H2B	began.
Table	1:	Help	to	Buy	loans	and	builders’	profitability
	 H2B	loans	(£m) Builders’	Margin	(%) Builders’	Return	on	Equity	(%)
2011 0 9.6 4.8
2012 0 11.9 7.7
2013 565 15.9 11.8
2014 1225 18 16
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2015 1469 19.9 19.7
2016 2096 21.4 20.6
	 H2B	loans	(£m) Builders’	Margin	(%) Builders’	Return	on	Equity	(%)
Sources:	See	here,	and	the	respective	annual	reports	and	accounts	for	Barratt,	Bellway,	Persimmon	and	Taylor	Wimpey.
The	profit	margin	shows,	for	each	£100	received	from	the	sale	of	a	home,	how	many	pounds	went	into	the	operating
profits	of	the	builder.	Suppose	a	home	costing	£90k	to	build	was	previously	sold	for	£100k:	operating	profit	was	£10k,
and	the	operating	margin	was	10%.	Then,	if	costs	are	unchanged	but	price	rises	to	£101k,	operating	profit	rises	by
the	whole	£1k,	and	the	margin	increases	to	roughly	11%.
One	report	suggests	that	H2B	has	allowed	builders	to	raise	selling	prices	by	towards	10%.	Table	1	shows	that	the
margin	was	roughly	12%	in	the	year	before	H2B.	It	grew	to	21%	in	the	last	year	for	which	data	are	available.	The
return	on	equity	shows,	for	each	£100	invested	in	the	companies	in	that	year	by	their	shareholders,	how	many
pounds	of	post-tax	earnings	were	generated	for	those	shareholders.	This	figure	rose	from	around	£8	before	H2B	to
over	£20	in	the	most	recent	year.
Table	2	shows	how	the	stock	market	responded	to	these	data.	It	compares	an	index	of	the	share	price	of
housebuilders	listed	on	the	stock	exchange	with	a	corresponding	index	for	companies	at	large	–	the	FTSE	350.	From
2009	to	2012,	they	moved	in	step.	After	H2B	was	introduced,	the	house-builders’	price	index	showed	a	startling	rise
from	150	in	2012	to	500	in	2016,	whereas	for	companies	at	large	it	rose	from	150	to	220.
Table	2:	Indices	of	share	prices
	 FTSE	350 Listed	house-builders 	
2009 100 100
2012 150 150
2016 220 500
Source:	see	here.
Now	we	are	not	claiming	that	H2B	is	responsible	for	all	the	gains	in	profits	and	share	prices.	But	the	correlation	is
consistent	with	there	being	the	house	price	response	economists	would	expect.	And	the	stock	market	certainly
credited	H2B	with	significant	profit	consequences	for	the	builders:	when	rumours	circulated	on	4	August	2017	that
H2B	might	be	withdrawn,	£1.3	billion	was	wiped	off	the	stock	market	value	of	the	five	biggest	builders	within	90
minutes.
Who	benefits?
Managers	as	well	as	shareholders	have	prospered	with	H2B.	The	benefits	received	by	one	or	two	senior	executives
of	these	builders	have	recently	attracted	media	attention.	Again	we	have	analysed	the	information	provided	by
companies’	annual	reports	on	executives’	incomes	and	gains	before	and	after	the	introduction	of	H2B.	The
accounting	rules	mean	that	their	published	benefits	figure	comprises	salary,	bonus,	pension	and	those	share	options
that	actually	vest	in	a	particular	year.	For	the	chief	executives	of	those	three	of	our	four	builders	whose	data	are
consistent,	the	average	annual	value	of	this	package	was	£2,040,000	in	2010-2012;	in	2013-16	it	was	£4,290,000.
They	also	gained	from	the	230%	rise	between	2013	and	2016	in	the	price	of	their	shares	in	their	companies	under
H2B	(Table	2).	In	their	last	annual	reports,	the	chief	executives	of	our	four	builders	held	collectively	around	£17million
of	shares	in	their	companies.
But	these	numbers	are	dwarfed	in	some	cases	by	further,	lagged,	benefits	which	have	arisen	from	share	options
(buying	company	shares	at	a	future	date	at	a	predetermined	price,	yielding	a	profit	for	the	executive	if	the	share	price
has	risen	in	the	meantime).	Often,	options	held	by	an	executive	can	only	be	exercised	at	some	future	date	if	certain
financial	performance	targets	are	met.	And	the	profit	will	depend	on	the	future	price	of	the	shares.	The	accountants
don’t	like	to	count	chickens	that	have	yet	to	be	hatched:	estimates	of	future	gains	which	might	be	realised	from	as	yet
unvested	options	are	therefore	excluded	from	the	annual	figures	we	noted	above.
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So	in	the	Persimmon	case,	for	example,	the	pay	figure	for	chief	executive	Fairburn	given	in	the	accounts	for	2016	–
confining	gains	from	share	options	to	those	realisable	in	the	respective	year	–	was	£2100k.	But	at	the	end	of	2017,
many	of	the	options	owned	by	Mr	Fairburn	in	2016	could	be	exercised	–	the	chickens	hatched.	The	chickens	turned
out	to	be	very	plump	indeed:	towards	£50million	for	Mr	Fairburn,	with	a	similar	further	gain	likely	to	come	later.
Aside	from	the	builders’	experience	with	H2B,	there	is	another	stark	fairness	consideration	–	concerning	the
distribution	of	the	subsidy	across	different	home	buyers.	The	biggest	beneficiary	of	H2B	is	a	Londoner	buying	a
£600k	home,	with	a	£240k	H2B	contribution.	To	qualify	for	the	maximum	accompanying	commercial	mortgage,	that
buyer	would	probably	have	to	be	in	the	top	10%	of	UK	earners.	As	against	that,	for	a	would-be	London	buyer	on
average	income,	a	commercial	mortgage	would	be	restricted	to	perhaps	£100k.	So	this	buyer’s	total	budget	to	buy	a
home	(combining	£100k	commercial	mortgage,	£67k	H2B	contribution,	and	deposit)	would	be	around	£175k.
At	current	interest	rates,	the	effective	H2B	subsidy	to	this	Londoner	in	the	top	10%	of	the	earnings	distribution	would
be	in	the	region	of	£140	per	week.	For	an	average	earner	in	London	it	would	be	just	£40	per	week;	outside	London
around	£14	per	week.	The	scheme	is	steeply	regressive.
A	further	distributional	impact	requires	even	more	tentative	estimation,	but	although	it	is	hard	to	pin	down,	it	can’t	be
ignored.	The	government’s	H2B	loans	obviously	have	to	be	funded.	On	current	plans,	financing	the	H2B	loans	will
add	some	£17billion	to	government	borrowing.	That	would	bring	an	extra	interest	bill	for	the	Exchequer	of	several
hundred	million	pounds	a	year.
With	the	current	taboo	on	raising	tax	rates,	that	means	corresponding	cuts	in	public	expenditure	if	H2B	is	to	be
financed	while	meeting	the	public	sector	deficit	target.	Examples	abound	of	such	cuts	in	recent	years,	from	cuts	in
nurses’	pay	to	freezes	in	benefits.	Particularly	relevant	to	the	issue	at	hand	is	the	tight	restriction	on	local	authority
building	of	affordable	homes	to	rent,	the	instrument	the	Conservative	Government	of	the	1950s	deployed	so
effectively	to	relieve	housing	shortages.
One	retort	to	this	line	of	argument	is	that	H2B	has	been	structured	so	as	to	be	costless	to	the	Exchequer.	These	are
“equity	loans”,	which	means	the	government’s	stake	in	a	participating	house	changes	at	the	same	rate	with	the	value
of	the	house.	As	house	prices	rise,	the	argument	goes,	the	government	achieves	capital	gains,	which	offset	the
interest	costs	of	servicing	the	debt	which	funds	H2B.	This	is	true.	But	similarly,	if	house	prices	fall,	then	the
Exchequer	will	be	faced	not	just	with	the	interest	bill	but	also	with	a	capital	loss	impairing	the	public	sector	balance
sheet:	the	total	cost	of	H2B	will	be	higher	still.
So	on	top	of	the	pressure	from	existing	home-owners	not	to	suffer	falls	in	the	value	of	their	homes,	and	from	house-
builders	anxious	to	keep	the	party	going,	H2B	creates	another	political	imperative	to	keep	the	bubble	inflating	–
avoiding	impairment	of	the	government’s	H2B	loans.	It	is	no	surprise	that	the	Chancellor	gave	the	housing	market
junkie	another	H2B	fix,	against	the	advice	of	most	economists.
____
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